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| CONSULTATION comments (EBA/CP/2021/38)  |
| To | : European Banking Authority |
| From | : NWB Bank |
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| Date | : 4 april 2022 |
| Subject | : [Subject] |
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NWB Bank appreciates the opportunity to respond to EBA’s consultations on IRRBB/CSRBB. The Bank also draws EBA’s attention to the responses submitted by the EBF, the European Banking Federation, the NVB, the association of Dutch banks, and EAPB, the European association of public banks. The Bank would like to draw EBA’s attention to the purpose served by promotional banks in financing socially beneficial activities. A strong focus on fair valuation and market valuation carries the risk that the guidelines become unduly burdensome to promotional banks and, consequently, to the societies they serve.

We submit the following response to the Consultation Paper on EBA/CP/2021/38 the “***Draft Regulatory Technical Standards specifying standardised and simplified standardised methodologies to evaluate the risks arising from potential changes in interest rates that affect both the economic value of equity and the net interest income of an institution’s non-trading book activities in accordance with 84(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU.***” for your further consideration.

**General remark:**

The bank asks that EBA recognises promotional and public banks provide financial services and funding for projects that support sustainable economic and social development. They are ‘not-for-profit’ banks. They, typically, provide their customers an alternative to capital markets that fail to price in the benefits of sustainable economic and social development to the community at large. They offer loans tailored for the needs of individual clients and commit long term to their clients. Consequently, the banking books of promotional and public banks will hold loans for which there are no deep and liquid markets. Commercial margins and spreads, generally, will reflect the banks’ missions and not the interest rate environment.

The bank has the following general observations relating to the draft Regulatory Technical Standards specifying standardised methodologies to evaluate IRRBB.

● **Regarding the application of the standardised approach:**

* The proposed standardised methodologies are not suitable for an appropriate identification, measurement and management of IRRBB.
* Only banks’ own internal measurement methods, including the necessary expertise and risk measurement methods, can ensure that interest rate risks in the banking book are adequately reflected in a bank-specific manner.
* Therefore, banks should, if at all, only be obliged to apply the standardised approaches as a very last measure and the period of application should be limited as far as possible.
* Consequently, there must also be no calculation of the SA for benchmarking purposes.

● **Regarding the preamble and slotting into maturity buckets:**

The preamble repeatedly refers to the slotting of cash flows in buckets. Preamble (9) suggest this facilitates institutions’ implementation. The method is unlikely to align with institutions’ administrations and inaccurate. Current IT solutions allow institution to generate accurate cash flow projections. Slotting those cash flows in artificial bucket would be costly and burdensome for institutions that implemented an accurate algorithm for discounting. We suggest EBA not to require slotting of cash flows into buckets if the institution uses a more accurate model for monitoring and managing its IRRBB. EBA might consider this as an option if the institution can show it cannot implement an accurate algorithm.

**● Regarding article 1:**

The Bank would like to point out that Article 1, paragraphs (5), (6), and (18) ignore instruments with hybrid interest rates that have a fixed ‘risk-free component’ until maturity, but a spread component adjusted at fixed times. We suggest EBA allows institutions to separately define repricing maturities for the ‘risk-free component’ and ‘spread component’ as far as such components are part of the measure for IRRBB.

**● Regarding article 3:**

The Bank requests EBA to further clarify Article 3, paragraph 1. Does the 5% threshold for a ‘material’ exposure apply only to the currency that surpasses the threshold, irrespective of the cumulative exposure of all currencies?

Article 3, paragraph 3 requires a re-calculation of the scheduled cash flow up to the repricing maturity to avoid gaps and double-counting in period NII. It may be expected a bank administers its due payments on loans granted. The method requires institutions to ignore their administrative payment schedules to create a fully fictional schedule of cash flows. This is unnecessarily burdensome.

**● Regarding article 4:**

The method of slotting cash flows in pre-defined buckets is unlikely to align with institutions’ administrations and inaccurate. It is likely an institution’s IT system that is capable of discounting cash flows will be better equipped to discount cash flows using the actual timing and corresponding discount rate. This would be contrary to the suggestion in preamble (9) this facilitates institutions’ implementation. Slotting cash flows in artificial bucket would be costly and burdensome for institutions that implemented an accurate algorithm for discounting.

The Bank suggests EBA not to require slotting of cash flows into buckets if the institution uses a more accurate model for monitoring and managing its IRRBB. EBA might consider this as an option if the institution can show it cannot implement an accurate algorithm.

Article 2, paragraph 1, requires inclusion of off-balance sheet instruments. In such case, the slotting of cash flows leads to spurious interest-rate sensitivity. A 10-year loan that has been granted forward in 10 years would be treated as a 20-year loan, when the sensitivity is that of a 10-year loan. It also results in applying the shock for a 20-year loan, when a 10-year interest-rate shock should be applied.

Article 1(1)(a) implies that a loan that only reprices the spread component of the coupon before the loan matures but not the risk-free component of the coupon reprices at the date the spread-component reprices. Subsequent application of article 4, paragraph 2 would result in underestimation of the interest rate risk, as the loan considered without a margin, or other spread component constitutes a fixed-rate loan.

**● Regarding article 6:**

The Bank requests EBA to clarify the term ‘contractual agreement’ used in Article 6, paragraph 1(b). The paragraph requires slotting of principal cash flows as per contractual agreement. It is not clear whether this is the contractual repricing date, as explicitly referred to in article 6, paragraph 1(a), or the contractual repayment date. The latter interpretation would require modelling of forward interest cash flows up to the instrument’s maturity. This would be contrary to statement (9) in the preamble.

**● Regarding article 7:**

Article 7, paragraph 3 refers to article 7, paragraph 1, whereas the distinction between core and non-core deposits is given in article 7, paragraph 2, and does not extend to all types of deposits listed in paragraph 1. Should article 7, paragraph 3, not refer to article 7, paragraph 2?

**● Regarding article 8:**

The explanatory box following article 8 requires, in the case of retail loans and securitisations of loans that only allow prepayment at fixed moments in time, e.g., mortgage loans, to be slotted based on a model that ignores the characteristics of the securitisation. Consequently, it requires a bank that has modelled expected cash flows from such securitisations to develop a further model for application of the standardised approach. This, again, makes the standardised approach a burdensome and costly method.

**● Regarding article 10:**

The Bank requests EBA to clarify what is meant by “the income and expenses deriving from the hedged position” in Article 10, paragraph 4.

**● Regarding article 11:**

The Bank requests EBA to confirm the title “other instruments” of Article 11 implies fixed-rate and floating-rate instruments, non-maturity deposits, including those subject to early redemption, and derivatives are not subject to optionality are not subject to the standards set by article 11?

**● Regarding article 12:**

The Bank requests EBA to clarify whether the relative increase in the implied volatility of the option only applies to the valuation of the option under the interest-shock scenario. If not, any hedge-relation will be broken, as article 12, paragraph 3 requires such for the offsetting option.

**● Regarding articles 14 and 15:**

Asymmetric treatment of hedge instruments and hedged instruments leads to spurious interest-rate sensitivity. When an institution hedges an embedded optionality with an automatic interest-rate option, it must carry the option at fair value. This is not necessarily the case for the hedged instrument with an embedded option the explicit option hedges. Hedge-accounting allows for adjustment of the balance value of the hedged instrument by adjusting its book value to offset the fair-value change in the hedging instrument. Such does not constitute fair valuation of the hedged instrument. Hedge-accounting avoids volatility in book results that add to zero over the lifetime of the loan. This reflects the economic reality of the hedge.

Article 14 applies to options that mature up to the interest income horizon. The holder either exercises the option or not. If it does not exercise the option, it loses the option value at the start of the period, not the change in value from an instantaneous shock. At the same time, the hedged embedded option loses its value. It would exercise the option to offset the exercise of the hedged embedded option. Hedge accounting will reflect the offset to net interest income and other comprehensive income provided by the hedge.

Article 15 applies to options that mature after the interest income horizon. Hedge accounting allows institutions an offset to the value of the hedged instrument to reflect the hedge.

Articles 14 and 15 treat hedge instruments and hedged instruments asymmetrically.

**● Regarding article 17:**

Article 17, paragraph 2, requires calculation of forward rates. This appears contrary to preamble (9) stating “to facilitate institutions’ implementation, this Regulation should not require neither a calculation of the discount rate nor the risk free forward rate, for each repricing cash flow ….”

If an institution’s administration can accurately determine both the timing of a cash flow and the repricing tenure, the same calculation can be performed without the need for creating an artificial cash flow schedule and non-existent tenures based on midpoints of time buckets for the sole purpose of applying a standardised calculation. It would require the development of an application for calculating numbers that provides the Bank’s management with inaccurate, if not incorrect information. EBA might consider this as an option if the institution can show it cannot implement an accurate algorithm.

**● Regarding article 20:**

Article 20 treats hedge instruments and hedged instruments asymmetrically. Such asymmetric treatment of hedge instruments and hedged instruments results in spurious risk measures.

When an institution hedges IRRBB with an interest-rate derivative, it must carry the derivative at fair value. This is not necessarily the case for the hedged instrument. Hedge-accounting allows for adjustment of the balance value of the hedged instrument by adjusting its book value to offset the fair-value change in the hedging instrument. Such does not constitute fair valuation of the hedged instrument. Hedge-accounting avoids volatility in book results that add to zero over the lifetime of the hedged instrument. This reflects the economic reality of the hedge. It does so for the exact reason that the ‘fair value’ of an instrument tends to return to its face value at maturity’ the explanatory box gives for limiting the calculation to instruments that mature beyond the horizon.

Article 20 requires institutions to calculate the change in the fair value of instruments up to the horizon. To do so, institutions must evaluate the forward rate at the horizon for each cash flow. Consequently, the slotting of cash flows up to the horizon into maturity buckets does not avoid the calculation forward rates for individual cash flows of instruments carried at fair value as suggested in preamble (9).

**Question 1:**

***What is the materiality of prepayments for floating rate instruments and what are the underlying factors? Would you prefer the inclusion of a requirement in Article 6 for institutions to estimate prepayments for these instruments?***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 1 as follows.

Prepayment on floating-rate loans, typically, is possible without a penalty only when the benchmark index reprices. Consequently, the impact on EVE of prepayments on such instruments is negligible if at all existent. The Bank, therefore, does not see any need for a requirement in Article 6 for institutions to estimate prepayments for these instruments.

**Question 2:**

***Do respondents find that the required determination of stable/non-stable deposits, and core/non-core deposits as described in Article 7 is reflective of the risks and operationally implementable? In case of any unintended consequence or undesirable effect on certain business models or specific activities, please kindly provide concrete examples.***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 2 as follows.

● The Bank asks EBA to clarify the perimeter of article 7, paragraph 12.

Promotional and public banks provide financial services and funding for projects that support sustainable economic and social development. Such banks may primarily or even exclusively have non-financial customers. Deposits from such customers may mainly be wholesale deposits.

The Bank provides only non-maturity wholesale deposits for operational reasons to its customers that are, with one exception, non-financial. These deposits are core to the Bank’s business model. The perimeter defined in article 7, paragraph 2, does not extend to such deposits. Consequently, article 7, paragraphs 3 to 11 would not apply to those deposits.

The single wholesale deposit for operational reasons to a financial customer, primarily, serves as a credit-risk mitigation. Identification of stable, non-stable, core, or non-core element is irrelevant for the Bank. Applying article 7 to this deposit would ignore its purpose, resulting in incorrect treatment of that particular wholesale deposit of a financial customer.

Article 7, paragraph 12 requires banks to identify non-maturity deposits as non-core deposits if they amount to less than 2% of relevant liabilities. Alternatively, if they amount to more than 2% of relevant liabilities, no such classification applies. Paragraph 12, however, is the only paragraph that does not explicitly exclude wholesale deposits of non-financial customers.

**Question 3:**

***Do respondents consider that all the necessary aspects have been covered in the draft regulatory standard? Do respondents find the provisions clear enough or would any additional clarification be needed on any aspect?*** ***Do respondents find that the required determination and application of a conditional prepayment rate and term deposit redemption rate as described in Article 8 and 9 is reflective of the risks and operationally implementable? In case of any unintended consequence or undesirable effect on certain business models or specific activities, please kindly provide concrete examples.***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 3 as follows.

Information technology allows for institutions to project cash flow schedules using actual maturities and tenures of instruments. The use of maturity and repricing buckets, likely, requires banks to implement a cash flow model for the sole purpose of performing the supervisory shock scenarios that is cumbersome, does not correspond to their administration, and is inaccurate.

● The Bank would like to draw EBA’s attention to the possibility that prepayments may induce penalty payments compensating the issuer for the loss in economic value or interest income. Article 8, paragraph 5 does not consider this possibility. The unconditional bucketing of expected prepayments, therefore, could add an error to the aforementioned inaccuracy.

**Question 4:**

***Is the treatment of fixed rate loan commitments to retail counterparties clear and are there other instruments with retail counterparties where a behavioural approach to optionality should be taken?***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 4 as follows.

● The Bank’s exposure to retail counterparties is limited to indirect exposures as meant in article 8, paragraph 7. Behavioural options would include take-up rates on offered loans for which there is limited reason to expect significant sensitivity to interest-rate movements. Consequently, we do not expect this to be a relevant issue for the Bank.

**Question 5:**

***Do respondents find that the required determination of the impact of a 25% increase in implicit volatility as described in Article 12 is operationally implementable?***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 5 as follows.

● The Bank requests EBA to clarify whether article 12 extends to embedded and explicit automatic options where the latter fully and effectively hedges the former; or, whether such hedged positions can be treated on a netted basis.

An Institution may hold or issue instruments that hold embedded options unique to the instrument. If the institution hedges the embedded option with an explicit option that may be unique and neither have a pricing history, nor have substitute for which the institution can observe prices. Unless institutions may net fully and effectively hedged automatic options embedded in their instruments with explicit options, article 12 would involve modelling options for which no data can be observed that allow institutions to derive implicit volatilities for the purpose of shocking these. Consequently, article 12 would not be ‘operationally implementable.’

**Question 6:**

***Do respondents find that the required slotting of repricing cash flows in accordance with the second dimension of original maturity/reference term as described in Article 13 is operationally implementable?***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 6 as follows.

● The Bank considers Article 13 not ‘operationally implementable.’

Information technology allows for institutions to project cash flow schedules using actual maturities and tenures of instruments. Article 13 requires institutions to develop an artificial cash-flow schedule for the purpose of applying the standardised approach where it has in place a model that generates the exact schedule for cash flows. The slotting of cash flows into maturity buckets creates an inaccurate projection for the management of the Bank’s liquidity position. The standardised approach would thus be unsuitable for internal management purposes. A preferable approach would be to build on the more accurate model if the institution has implemented such.

**Question 7:**

***Do respondents find it practical how the determination of several components of the NII calculation, with in particular the fair value component of Article 20 and the fair value component of automatic options of Article 15, is generally based on the processes used for the EVE calculation (in particular Article 16 and Article 12)?***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 7 as follows.

● It is the Bank’s opinion the determination of fair value components of NII results in spurious outcomes for NII sensitivity to IRRBB.

Promotional and public banks provide financial services and funding for projects that support sustainable economic and social development. They offer loans tailored for the needs of individual clients and commit long term to their clients. Consequently, the banking books of promotional and public banks will hold loans for which there are no deep and liquid markets. Furthermore, commercial margins and spreads, generally, will reflect the banks’ missions and not the interest rate environment.

Most accounting regimes require institutions to carry traded and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives at ‘fair value.’ Promotional and public banks, by the nature of their business, may carry large parts of their assets and liabilities at amortised cost. They can hedge their exposures and apply hedge accounting to offset the change in the fair value of the hedging instrument. Hedge accounting does not reclassify the hedged instrument as ‘fair value’ instrument.

Article 20 requires institutions to calculate an add-on for instruments held at fair value. These include the hedge instruments, but, not necessarily, the hedged instruments. The asymmetric treatment of the hedge instrument and hedged instrument in articles 15 and 20 causes spurious outcomes for the NII measure of IRRBB.

In the explanatory box following article 20, EBA states ‘Since the fair value of instruments tends to return to their face value at maturity, Article 20 only focuses on fair value instruments that mature beyond the horizon for the calculation of net interest income.’ Hedge accounting allows institutions to adjust for that same characteristic of derivatives maturing beyond the horizon used to hedge instruments not carried at fair value.

**Question 8:**

***Do respondents find that the calculation of the net interest income add-on for basis risk is reflective of the risk and operationally implementable?***

We respond EBA with reference to Question 8 as follows.

● The Bank considers the calculation of the net interest income add-on for basis risk not ‘operationally implementable.’

In a concurrent consultation, EBA suggests the competent authority imposes a standardised approach on an institution that has an inadequate internal system for the management of IRRBB. EBA further imposes artificial slotting of cash flows into maturity buckets to facilitate calculations. Yet, EBA requires institutions that have an inadequate internal system for the management of IRRBB to be equipped to model conditional widening and narrowing of spreads between basic rates. The explanatory box, further, adds institutions should do so conditional on the interest rate environment without defining such.

A change in basic rates impacts the fair value of interest derivatives that mature beyond the horizon and are fair-value instruments. Asymmetric treatment of the hedge instrument and hedged instrument causes spurious outcomes for the NII measure of IRRBB.

NWB Bank