**European Banking Authority (EBA) Consultation Paper**

**On**

**Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on prudent valuation under Article 105(14) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 Capital**

 **Requirements Regulation (CRR) - (EBA/CP/2013/28)**

**Dated 10 July 2013**

**Response of the**

**Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) and**

**International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA)**

**8th October 2013**

**A. Introduction**

AFME[[1]](#footnote-1), ISDA[[2]](#footnote-2) and their members (“the industry”) welcome the opportunity to comment on the above Consultation Paper (“the Paper”) issued by the EBA. We note that this consultation forms part of an ongoing EBA consultation process with the industry and others to address this challenging and judgemental subject and the industry continues to be willing to work with the Competent Authorities as this process moves towards the issuance of a final Regulatory Technical Standard (“RTS”).

We would also like to acknowledge the progress made since the publication of last year’s Discussion Paper and believe that although not yet a fully workable proposal the ideas set out in the consultation paper in the main are achievable. We do though note that some of the proposals are significantly burdensome and do not effectively use existing processes which could achieve the same aims for a significantly reduced cost and therefore recommend some changes to the proposals as outlined below.

**B. Highlights**

Before answering the specific questions raised we would like to highlight a small number of key areas where the industry feels that either the guidance is not practical in its current form or is an inefficient route to achieving its aims.

**Article 8 and 9 volatility measure**

Whilst the approach of firms to “bucketing” of risk for bid/offer calculations are based on their risk management strategies, the industry understands the need for guidance around the “bucketing” of risks. However, the industry does not believe that the 100 day volatility threshold used in article 8 and 9 has been appropriately designed or calibrated. One specific concern of the industry is that as currently defined the detailed test calibrates to an approx. 99.5% correlation between inputs and as such effectively prevents any netting taking place between different risk buckets.  To ensure any final guidance is appropriately designed and calibrated, we believe it would be beneficial that the Competent Authorities consult with the industry before an alternative suggestion is included in the RTS.

We do not believe this is the intention of the consultation paper and risks making the QIS polluted as it will cause the numbers within the market price uncertainty and close-out cost categories to be artificially inflated and will therefore make meaningful comparison impossible as it may also add variability around interpretation as some institutions may attempt to calculate based on the intention rather than the wording. We would therefore suggest that this is clarified prior to the QIS submission deadline.

**Article 20**

The industry does not believe that Article 20 is an appropriate methodology for testing the appropriateness of AVA levels. The suggested approach seems to suggest that we should rely on values interpolated between the current AVA calculation date and the previous AVA calculation date as though the market moves happened linearly over time.

Significant industry investment has already occurred in “new deal review” processes which allow institutions to compare their trading levels to where they are marked. These processes already provide a good indication of whether trading levels are consistent with books and records marks and therefore if these demonstrate that there is not a significant or concentrated amount of trading occurring at levels worse than the books and records marks then by the nature of the prudential marks being equal to or more conservative than books and records marks this also holds true for prudential marks.

We would therefore request that the standard be written to support these processes rather than creating an alternate testing approach which will be significantly burdensome and be duplicative to processes that should already be in place.

**Article 7**

The default charge of 10% of notional under Article 7 paragraph 4, where application of Articles 8 to 16 has not been possible, could amount to a very large charge very quickly with each $10 Billion of gross notional amounting to $1 Billion of charge. The Industry would not expect to include amounts for this within the QIS exercise but may in the future need to use the default charge, for example if there is a period of significant market dislocation over a calculation period. For this reason we feel that this charge as currently written is unpredictable and could lead to an uncontrolled and excessive increase in capital requirements during a period of significant market stress making it procyclical and at risk of becoming an issue to institutions at the point of market stress.

Additionally as indicated later in this document, unrealised profit is not appropriate as a measure of valuation uncertainty due to its lack of linkage to market risks and from a practical perspective unrealised profits and losses are typically not stored within the institutions’ systems since they are generally not required for financial statement disclosure purposes and therefore to build systems to calculate and retain them would represent an unnecessary cost as also indicated in the recent response to possible treatments of unrealised gains under Article 80.

**Overlap with other regulatory requirements**

We note that within the UK Prudential Regulatory Authority requirements for reporting prudential valuation there is specific allowance for where AVA’s are not reported due to them already being picked up elsewhere in the regulatory framework. We believe it would be beneficial to codify a similar allowance within the standard to ensure that it appropriately deals with the potential overlap with existing or future regulatory requirements that may also affect the carrying value of assets and liabilities.

**Tax Offset**

We note that within the UK Prudential Regulatory Authority requirements for reporting prudential valuation there is specific allowance for an offset of tax liability reductions if the prudent values were utilised in place of the fair values. We believe it would be beneficial to codify a similar allowance within the standard to ensure that this will be able to be applied consistently throughout the various member states.

**Implementation cost/timing**

We note that the requirements of the consultation paper prescribe a number of calculations and monitoring approaches which are not consistent with the way banks currently monitor the valuations of their portfolios. To implement these will require significant investment. As discussed elsewhere the ratio of last 100 days volatility test within Articles 8 and 9 and the ongoing monitoring tool within Article 20 would add significant costs without benefit. Setting these aside, institutions would still require significant time to be able to design, test and implement the system enhancements which will be required to satisfy the requirements of the final RTS when issued.

If the final RTS is issued in April 2014 we do not feel that there will be sufficient time to fully implement the requirements by 1 January 2015.

**Scope**

The Scope of the application of Article 34 of the CRR - Article 34 of the CRR states “Institutions shall apply the requirements of Article 105 to all their **assets** measured at fair value when calculating the amount of their own funds and shall deduct from Common Equity Tier 1 capital the amount of any additional value adjustments necessary.” It is not clear however from the Consultation Paper whether the scope relates to ‘all assets measured at fair value’ or ‘all financial instruments measured at fair value’. We would assume the latter, i.e. all financial instruments, as all assets measured at fair value could mean that property, plant and equipment, goodwill, etc. could also fall under the RTS, however further clarification would be helpful here.

**Simplified Approach**

We feel that, as mentioned in our combined response to Questions 4 and 5, the inclusion of net unrealised profit within the Simplified approach (and in Article 7 of the core approach) is both not appropriate as a measure of valuation uncertainty and would require costly systems upgrades as the realised and unrealised split is not typically retained since it is generally not required for accounting purposes.

The above points around difficulty to implement the requirements of the draft RTS lead us to point out that it will be very difficult to utilise the QIS for calibration.

With regard to the Simplified approach many Institutions will be unable to calculate the net unrealised profits which form a part of this calculation since they do not store this information. The alternative suggestion included in the joint response to Questions 4 and 5 both eliminates the requirement for unrealised calculations and enables EBA to calibrate likely charges directly from the financial statements.

**C. Responses to the Consultation Paper Questions**

**Q1. Do you agree with the minimum list of alternative methods and sources of information defined above for expert based approaches? If not, what others could be included, or which points from the current list should be removed? State your reasons.**

In general we feel the items in the list are reasonable. However we also noted that Article 3 paragraph 3 states “alternative methods and sources of information shall be considered, including all of the following”. This would appear to stipulate they all must be used all the time, which we feel isn’t practical.

We therefore don’t agree that they all have to be considered in each case. For instance, natural bounds should not have to be calculated and considered in each and every case that one is available. Equally, does every trade have to be calculated using correlations of +/-1 and every long option have to be considered with a volatility of zero?

We also noted there is a similar issue with the use of “all” in the previous paragraph (Article 3 (2)).

The list of sources may also change over time so we wouldn’t want the wording to suggest that the list is fixed and therefore inflexible to changes of sources over time.

We therefore recommend that “all of” should be deleted from the sentence.

We would propose rewording Article 3(2) as:

“The market data used to determine a prudent value shall **consider available and reliable data sources,** **including the following, where relevant:**

1. Exchange prices in a liquid market;
2. Trades in the exact same or very similar instrument, either from the institution’s own records or, where available, trades from across the market;
3. Tradable quotes from brokers and other market participants;
4. Consensus service data;
5. Indicative broker quotes; and/**or**
6. Counterparty collateral valuations.”

We would also propose rewording Article 3(3) as follows:

“For cases where an expert based approach is applied for the purpose of Articles 8 to 10, alternative methods and sources of information shall be considered, **including the following, where relevant:**

1. The use of proxy data based on similar instruments for which sufficient data is available;
2. The application of prudent shifts to valuation inputs; and/***or***
3. The identification of natural bounds to the value of an instrument.”

**Q2.** **Do you agree with the introduction of a threshold below which a simplified approach can be applied to calculate AVAs? If so, do you agree that the threshold should be defined as above? State your reasons.**

We agree with a threshold below which a Simplified approach could be used. We also feel that restricting the threshold to on-balance sheet fair-valued assets only will make the test much simpler requiring as a result only a simple review of the financial statements.

However, the concept of inclusion of off-balance sheet items at fair value seems to overcomplicate matters and is therefore potentially confusing. We are struggling to understand what would be required here as we generally only calculate the fair value of items where the fair value is recognised on-balance sheet, for instance commitments may be thought of as “off balance sheet”, however where they are fair-valued, the fair-value is recognised on the balance sheet. We also feel the inclusion of liabilities in the threshold is not beneficial and seems to be not in line with the scope in Article 34 of the CRR which mentions only assets.

We would also recommend the threshold takes into account multipliers for different levels of the Fair Value Hierarchy (FVH) with multipliers of 0 for those in Level 1 of the FVH, 1 for those in Level 2 and a higher multiple for those in Level 3. In order to avoid an issue where the RTS references GAAP which may be subject to future change, the wording for the definitions of the FVH taken from GAAP could we feel also be included within the RTS. The utilisation of the FVH would “utilise information that should be readily available within institutions as the foundation of the approach” similar to the aim with the Core Approach. For institutions preparing financials where the local GAAP does not require FVH classification they could instead utilise the simple balance sheet fair value with a single multiplier.

We would also suggest that the EBA and Competent Authorities could quite easily utilise the disclosures within the existing financial statements of institutions in order to calibrate acceptable multiples and balances for use in this methodology.

**Q3. Do you believe there are any practical issues with a parent institution being required to apply the ‘core approach’ to all fair value positions whilst a subsidiary is allowed to apply the simplified approach? State your reasons.**

We do not believe this will cause an issue over and above the general practical issues of implementation which financial institutions implementing the Core Approach would have.

**Q4. Do you agree with the proposed simplified approach? Do you think the risk sensitiveness of the approach is appropriate? Are there alternative approaches that you believe would be more appropriate? State your reasons.**

**Q5. Could a differentiated treatment for some asset/liability classes be considered, for example with regard to their liquidity? Please state the pros and cons of such a differentiation. How would you define the degree of liquidity of an asset/liability class (e.g. fair value hierarchy, eligibility for the LCR, other)?**

Given they are related we will answer Questions 4 & 5 together.

As with our response to Question 2, we feel the Simplified approach could be applied solely to on-balance sheet fair valued assets. We also feel that having different multipliers for different Fair Value Hierarchy levels would be beneficial with 0 for Level 1 and differing levels for Level 2 and 3.

We do not feel that an additional charge based on unrealised profit is reasonable. We believe, if adopted, it would give rise to far too much inconsistency as financial institutions holding identical positions would incur different charges depending on when they took on that position, the direction the position they held (a buyer of a position that is now in the money would be charged but the seller on the other side of the trade would not) and whether they use FIFO, LIFO or average cost. For these reasons we do not believe that unrealised profit is an appropriate measure of valuation uncertainty.

Additionally from a practical perspective, unrealised profits and losses are typically not stored within the institution’s systems since they are generally not required for financial statement disclosure purposes and therefore to build systems to calculate and retain them would represent an unnecessary cost to such institutions.

As already mentioned in our response to Question 3, the EBA could review the financial statements of financial institutions in order to calibrate what the appropriate multipliers would be, bearing in mind that the current proposed 0.1% of Balance sheet would be a maximum of €15 Million with a €15 Billion threshold. For the institutions preparing financial statements where the local GAAP does not require FVH classification they could instead use the simple applicable balance sheet fair value with a single multiplier (for instance, 0.1%).

**Q6.** **Do you agree with the approach defined above to calculate an AVA where the approaches in Article 8 and 9 are not possible for a valuation exposure? If not, what other approach could be prescribed? Explain your reasoning.**

We believe that this approach, if adopted, would be potentially extremely punitive. It may well be that this was intentional, in order that institutions will endeavor to find an alternative acceptable approach and avoid this punitive charge, however we would note that:

* It will take some time for institutions to implement the required processes across all their positions;
* The use of net unrealised profits suffers from the same shortfalls as mentioned in our response to Questions 4 & 5 above;
* The charge in Article 7 is highly procyclical and if at some future point in time a market moves to a state of dislocation where there is not a way of estimating the charge (even for a short period of time that crosses a calculation date) then the 10% of notional charge could be extremely damaging and with $1 Billion of capital required per $10 Billion of gross notional could become very large very quickly. For this reason we feel that this charge as currently written is unpredictable and could lead to an uncontrolled, excessive increase in capital requirements during a period of significant market stress making it procyclical and at risk of becoming an issue to institutions at the point of market stress;
* While recognising that it is to be used for a different purpose, we would like to point out that the charge of 25% relating to balance sheet market value is 250 times as large as that proposed under the simplified method
* From a practical perspective, assuming that a more appropriate/viable alternative calculation is reached and ultimately agreed, there will of course need to be sufficient implementation time after issuance of the final RTS or a potential reasonable phase-in timeline of the amended approach to be taken as part of the implementation of Article 7.

The industry would be happy to work with the EBA and the relevant Competent Authorities to develop an alternative methodology and suitable alternative wording for this fallback calculation

**Q7. Do you agree with the approaches defined above to calculate AVAs for market price uncertainty, close-out costs, and unearned credit spreads? If not, what other approach could be prescribed? State your reasons.**

The overall methodologies for the calculations should make clear that for market price uncertainty, we are not expected to come up with a curve or surface that has discontinuities and which reflects a “Frankenstein”curve as a result of taking high levels at points with short exposure and low levels at points with long exposure **(see below the illustration taken from the example in Section 5.1 of the Consultation Paper)**. The curve or surface used needs to be a realistic curve or surface and could for example be constructed by utilising the available curves/surfaces in their entirety. The example at the back of the Consultation Paper also does not suggest this as a potential method despite discussions with various Competent Authorities showing that they believe it to be acceptable.

Additionally the backtesting within Article 8 paragraph 4 (b) and Article 9 paragraph 5 (b) we feel is inappropriate. We would note that while the intention of selecting a ratio of 0.1 between the two volatilities seems superficially linked to the concept of 90% certainty, this hasn’t been fully thought through. In order to achieve the ratio of 0.1 for volatilities (which is the square root of the variance), this means achieving a ratio of the variances of 0.01 which implies a correlation between the reduced and unreduced valuation input P&L’s of 99.5%.

In addition, while being overly complicated for simple curves, in our view it is practically impossible for many volatility surfaces and would be a huge burden. Discussions with individuals at the national Competent Authorities indicated that the test wouldn’t be expected to be performed as written which adds further to the argument concerning its recognised impracticality.

This will cause potential issues with the reliability of the numbers calculated within the QIS, as discussed within Section B earlier.

With regard to certain other amendments we feel that:

1. Article 8 paragraph 2 (a) should be amended to include “a tradable price or value for a valuation exposure or a price or value that can be determined from reliable data…” since “a tradable price” may be felt to exclude for instance a swap rate since it is not a price.
2. Article 8 paragraph 4 (a) and Article 9 paragraph 5 (a) should be amended to reflect the fact that some non-derivative positions will require analysis of their inputs as opposed to their price and so should be amended to say something like “Institutions shall calculate AVAs on valuation exposures related to each valuation input used in the relevant valuation model. The valuation input may be the price of the instrument”, with the word “may” replacing the word “will”.
3. Article 8 paragraph 5 (a) (1) should be amended to replace the words “exit prices” with “exit values” and the word “price” with “value” since the valuation input may not be based on a price so that it reads “For a valuation input where the range of plausible values is based on exit values, institutions shall estimate a point within the range where it is 90% confident it could exit the valuation exposure at that value or better”.
4. Similarly for Article 8 paragraph 5 (a) (2) “price” should be replaced with “value” to become “For a valuation input where the range of plausible values is created from mid values, institutions shall estimate a point within the range where it is 90% confident that the mid value it could achieve in exiting the valuation exposure would be at that value or better ”

v. Article 9 we feel may need some rewording as paragraphs 2-4 do not seem to recognise the fact that the calculation of market price uncertainty in Article 8 may have been calculated on an exit basis as per Article 8 paragraph 5 (a) and so would not require further close-out costs within Article 9. Paragraph 2 only exempts this calculation where there is “firm evidence of a tradable price”. The close-out costs should clearly only be required where market uncertainty has not been calculated as an exit uncertainty. Article 9 paragraph 2 should therefore be amended to read something like: “When an institution has calculated a market price uncertainty AVA for a valuation exposure based on exit values, the close-out cost AVA may be assessed to have zero value”

 vi. Either Article 9 should include a section that allows full portfolio exit costs to be calculated including the future administrative cost aspect or the future administrative cost section in Article 14 should be amended to allow the calculation to reflect the future administrative costs a market participant would charge if the portfolio were being exited (please also see our response to Question 8).

The industry would of course be happy to work with the EBA and Competent Authorities on some form of suitable alternative wording for these key AVA’s.

**Example of a “Frankenstein” forward curve**:

This uses the FV rates and upper/lower ranges from table 1 of the example in Section 5.1 of the Consultation Paper. It can be seen that the original Fair Value swap rates “Rate (Original)” and the Prudent Value rates “Rate (EBA)” seem to correlate closely as is to be expected for swap curves. However if we analyse the impact on the forward points then what was a relatively smooth forward curve becomes very jagged and is unrealistic.

This impact could be much worse in many cases, even causing negative forward rates or volatilities that would cause model issues. We particularly wanted to illustrate the impact purely with the information that was provided within the Paper in order to demonstrate how this effect is very likely to occur with the current wording.



Please note we have increased the number of switches between long and short risk positions to better illustrate the effect

**Q8. Do you agree with the approaches defined in Articles 11 to 16 to calculate the various categories of AVAs? If not, what other approach could be prescribed for each AVA? State your reasons.**

Article 11 - Model Risk - This seems reasonable, however we would note that the Model Risk is closely linked with market uncertainty/closeout costs and so we feel it should be included within the aggregated AVA diversification calculations.

Article 12 – Concentrated Positions – This seems reasonable, however we would note that the typical daily trading volume of an institution often has little real bearing on whether it has a concentrated position or not since there will be numerous counterparties with which to exit their positions even when they themselves are not market makers.

Article 13 - Investing and Funding Costs - We feel the wording should be amended slightly in order to say “Institutions shall estimate the AVA by including the expected funding costs and benefits over the expected contractual lifetime of each derivative trade which is not strongly collateralised”, therefore emphasising it is the expected contractual lifetime that the expected costs and benefits should be calculated over.

Article 14 - Future administrative costs - We feel that as currently drafted the wording is out of line with the objectives of the other AVA’s which are to estimate a prudent exit value. More appropriate wording we feel could therefore be: “The entity should calculate the future administrative cost adjustment taking into consideration the lower of the costs that it would incur in managing the portfolio or the incremental costs that would be charged by a market participant if they were taking on the portfolio”. We also feel that an institution should have the option to calculate these costs within Article 9 close-out costs as described in Question 7 above.

Article 15 - Early termination - The suggested wording seems reasonable, so no further comments.

Article 16 – Operational Risks - We feel that this section of the Consultation Paper is unclear and perhaps as a result, may not make sense. As we noted earlier, this should not be part of Prudent Valuation given that Operational Risk is already either subject to Advanced Measurement Approach or to an Add-On where the Competent Authority feels it’s appropriate. We would also note that the wording within the Consultation Paper appears illogical asking in paragraph 1 for certain calculations to be performed and then asking for an arbitrary charge of 10% of certain other AVA’s in paragraph 3. This arbitrary charge would lead us to conclude that the drafters agree that this AVA is not meaningful in its own right.

**Q9. Are there cases where the above AVAs may have a zero value that could be defined in the RTS? If yes, please specify.**

The industry does not feel there is a need to define cases of specific zero value AVA’s within the RTS as the guidance provides a meaningful principles based approach. Though not specifically requested in this question we would again highlight the slightly flawed wording within Article 9 that is mentioned within our response to Question 7. Closeout costs should clearly be zero whenever the market price uncertainty has been calculated on an exit basis and should not be limited to the sole example mentioned in Article 9.

**Q10. Do you agree with the approach defined above for the aggregation of valuation exposure level AVAs within the market price uncertainty and close-out cost AVA categories? If not, what other approach could be prescribed? State your reasons.**

We are pleased that the EBA recognises the need for diversification. As discussed in the response to Question 8 we think that Model Risk is very similar to market price uncertainty and overlaps with it and so Article 11 should also be brought within this diversification benefit.

**Q11. Do you agree that category level AVAs described in Articles 11 to 16 within the core approach should be aggregated as a simple sum? If not, what other approach could be prescribed? State your reasons.**

As per the response to Question 10 we feel that Model Risk is very similar to market price uncertainty and so should be included within the diversification applicable to market price uncertainty and close-out costs.

**Q12. Do you agree with the requirement for institutions using the core approach to implement the above ongoing monitoring tool as an indicator of the adequacy of data sources of valuation inputs used to calculate the AVAs described in Articles 8 to 10? If not, what other approach could be prescribed? State your reasons.**

We are somewhat confused and concerned by Article 20. We do not see any benefits deriving from this proposed “Ongoing Monitoring”, although we do see very material potential costs in order to build and support the required system builds. We are therefore struggling to determine that what is proposed would be achievable. We cannot for instance understand what is meant by interpolating “between estimated prudent value parameters at the previous AVA calculation date and … the current AVA calculation date”. Are we for example to try to interpolate values between two dates that are three months apart as if market moves happened linearly across this time? We feel this test is a waste of resources as it gives no meaningful or useful information as was the case with the ongoing monitoring tool mentioned in the previous Discussion Paper. We would note that trading information will generally only be available for the more liquid positions with less valuation uncertainty where market movements would distort results. We feel that good daily profit & loss explain/attribution should be capable of covering the requirement for ongoing monitoring and is in line with the objective “to limit the burden of calculation by using data … that should be readily available within institutions as the foundation of the approach”.

**Q13. Do you agree with our analysis of the impact of the proposals in this CP? If not, can you provide any evidence or data that would explain why you disagree or might further inform our analysis of the likely impacts of the proposals?**

Although we haven’t had the opportunity to analyse in detail the costs and benefits of the Consultation Paper, we do feel that the costs related to certain proposals would far outweigh any potential benefits. These have also been discussed in Section B and in the responses to Questions 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12.

Within the core approach we feel that the ratio of last 100 days volatility measure within Articles 8 and 9 and the ongoing monitoring tool within Article 20 will take very material amounts of resources while still not necessarily being either achievable as well as being of little or in fact no benefit.

We also feel that as mentioned in our combined response to Questions 4 and 5 the inclusion of net unrealised profit within the simplified approach (and in Article 7 of the core approach) is not appropriate as a measure of valuation uncertainty and would require costly systems upgrades since the realised and unrealised split is not typically stored and therefore retained since it is generally not required for accounting purposes.

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1. The Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) advocates stable, competitive and sustainable European financial markets that support economic growth and benefit society. AFME promotes fair, orderly, and efficient European wholesale capital markets and provides leadership in advancing the interests of all market participants. AFME represents a broad array of European and global participants in the wholesale financial markets. Its members comprise pan-EU and global banks as well as key regional banks, brokers, law firms, investors and other financial market participants. AFME participates in a global alliance with the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) in the US, and the Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association through the GFMA (Global Financial Markets Association). For more information please visit the AFME website, [www.afme.eu](http://www.afme.eu). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Since 1985, ISDA has worked to make the global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets safer and more efficient. Today, ISDA has over 800 member institutions from 60 countries. These members include a broad range of OTC derivatives market participants including corporations, investment managers, government and supranational entities, insurance companies, energy and commodities firms, and international and regional banks. In addition to market participants, members also include key components of the derivatives market infrastructure including exchanges, clearinghouses and repositories, as well as law firms, accounting firms and other service providers. Information about ISDA and its activities is available on the Association's web site: [www.isda.org](http://www.isda.org). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)