Response to discussion on the potential review of the investment firms’ prudential framework
Q1: What would be the operational constraints of potentially removing the threshold?
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Q2: Would you suggest any further element to be considered regarding the thresholds used for the categorisation of Class 3 investment firms?
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Q3: Do you have any views on the possible ways forward discussed above regarding the transition of investment firms between Class 2 and Class 3 should be introduced?
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Q4: Should the minimum level of the own funds requirements be different depending on the activities performed by investment firms or on firms’ business model? If yes, which elements should be considered in setting such minimum?
Yes, for class 3 firms, the minimum level of the own funds requirements should be different
depending on the activities performed by investment firms or the firms’ business model.
The capital requirement for class 3 firms should be further refined to account for the needs of a
startup firm that would like to offer the service of investment advice. Furthermore, the capital
requirement should not be an impediment to such startup firms, as it is currently the case in Cyprus.
Per MiFID II regulation, investment advice can be offered through two channels: either under Article
3 (no EU passporting allowed, no minimum capital required) or by obtaining an investment firm
license (EU passporting allowed, minimum capital of €75,000- class 3 firm).
In Cyprus though, under the current CySEC regulatory framework, obtaining a class 3 type licence is
the ONLY way for a market professional to offer investment advice. There is no provision in the
Cypriot regulation that would allow one to offer investment advice under Article 3 of MiFID, as one
can find in other EU countries such as France (Financial Advisors) and Lithuania. Therefore, market
professionals in Cyprus, in order to start their own business in offering investment advice, even to
customers located only in Cyprus (i.e. no EU passporting), need to have an initial capital of €75,000.
Furthermore, for a class 3 firm that is also a startup (few or zero clients), professional indemnity
insurance should be allowed to be used for satisfying initial capital requirements (as was the case
before the introduction of IFR).
With respect to setting minimums, a tiered system could be used for class 3 firms. One relevant
factor could be the size of assets under advisory relationship the firm has with its clients (for
example, in the US, firms with assets under advisory of less than $100m are not required to be
registered with the US SEC but are registered at the state level. Another factor could be the type of
products (simple or complex) the firm is providing to its clients on the basis that complex products
carry more risk and potentially greater future liabilities to the firm in case of misconduct by the firm
towards its clients.
Q5: Is it necessary to differentiate the deductibles by activity or by business model for the purpose of calculating the FOR? If yes, which items should then be considered and for what reasons?
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Q6: Are expenses related to tied agents material for the calculation of the FOR to the extent to require a dedicated treatment for their calculation? If yes, are the considerations provided above sufficient to cover all the relevant aspects?
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Q7: Should the FOR be calculated distinguishing the costs related to non-MiFID activities, which criteria should be considered? What kind of advantages or disadvantages would this have in practice?
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Q8: Should expenses related to fluctuation of exchange rates be included in the list of deductions for the calculation of the FOR? If yes, which criteria should be considered in addition to the ones suggested above?
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Q9: Should the concept of ‘ongoing advice’ be further specified for the purpose of calculating the K-AUM? If yes, which elements should be taken into account in distinguishing a recurring provision of investment advice from a one-off or non-recurring one?
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Q10: Does the K-DTF provide a proper level of capital requirements for the provision of the services Trading on own account and execution of order on behalf of clients on account of the investment firm? If not, what elements of the calculation of the K-DTF present most challenges?
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Q11: Would you have any examples where the calculation of the K-DTF based on comparable activities or portfolios results in very different or counterintuitive outcomes? If yes, how could the calculation of the K-DTF be improved?
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Q12: What are the elements of the current methodology for the calculation of the K-ASA that raise most concerns? Taking into account the need to avoid complexifying excessively the methodology, how could the calculation of the K-ASA be improved to assess those elements?
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Q13: Clients’ asset protection may be implemented differently in different Member States. Should this aspect be considered in the calculation of the K-ASA? If so, how should that be taken into account in the calculation?
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Q14: Should crypto-assets be included into K-factor calculation, either as a new K-factor or as part of K-NPR?
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Q15: In the context of addressing operational risk for investment firm trading on own account, is there any further element to be considered to ensure that the requirements are proportionate to their trading activities?
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Q16: The discussion paper envisages the possibility to rely on alternative methodologies with respect to the K-DTF. If the respondents suggest an alternative approach, how would this refer to the two activities addressed under the K-DTF (trading on own account and execution on own account on behalf of the clients)?
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Q17: When addressing other activities an investment firm may perform, which elements, on top of the discussed ones, should be also taken in consideration?
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Q18: Investment firms performing MiFID activities 3 and 6 (trading on own account and underwriting on a firm commitment basis) are more exposed to unexpected liquidity needs because of market volatility. What would be the best way to measure and include liquidity needs arising from these activities as a liquidity requirement?
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Q19: Investment firms performing the activities of providing loans and credit to clients as an ancillary service in a non-negligeable scale would be more exposed to liquidity risks. What would be the best way to measure such risk in order to take them into account for the purposes of the liquidity requirements?
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Q20: Investment firms, providing any of the MiFID services, but exposed to substantial exchange foreign exchange risk may be exposed to liquidity risks. What would be the best way to measure such risk in order to take them into account for the purposes of the liquidity requirements?
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Q21: Are there scenarios where the dependency on service providers, especially in third countries, if disrupted, may lead to unexpected liquidity needs? What type of services such providers perform?
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Q22: Are there scenarios where the dependency on liquidity providers, especially in third countries, would lead to unexpected liquidity needs? Could you provide some examples?
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Q23: What other elements should be considered in removing the possibility of the exemption in Article 43 of the IFR?
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Q24: Do you have any views on the possible ways forward discussed above concerning the provision of MiFID ancillary services by UCITS management companies and AIFMs?
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Q25: Are differences in the regulatory regimes between MICAR and IFR/IFD a concern to market participants regarding a level playing field between CASPs and Investment firms providing crypto-asset related services? In particular, are there concerns on the capital and liquidity requirement regimes?
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Q26: Sections 5.2, 5.4 as well as this Section 9.1 all touch upon how crypto-assets (exposures and services) may influence the IFD and the IFR. Is there any other related element that should be considered in the review of the investment firms’ prudential framework?
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Q27: Is the different scope of application of remuneration requirements a concern for firms regarding the level playing field between different investment firms (class 1 minus and class 2), UCITS management companies and AIFMs, e.g., in terms of the application of the remuneration provisions, the ability to recruit and retain talent or with regard to the costs for the application of the requirements?
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Q28: Are the different provisions on remuneration policies, related to governance requirements and the different approach to identify the staff to whom they apply a concern for firms regarding the level playing field between different investment firms (class 1 minus under CRD or class 2 under IFD), UCITS management companies and AIFMs, e.g. in terms of the application of the remuneration provisions, the ability to recruit and retain talent or with regard to the costs for the application of the requirements?
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Q29: Are the different provisions, criteria and thresholds regarding the application of derogations to the provisions on variable remuneration, and that they apply to all investment firms equally without consideration of their specific business model, a concern to firms regarding the level playing field between different investment firms (class 1 minus under CRD and class 2 under IFD), UCITS management companies and AIFMs, e.g., in terms of the application of the remuneration provisions, the ability to recruit and retain talent or with regard to the costs for applying the deferral and pay out in instruments requirements? Please provide a reasoning for your position and if possible, quantify the impact on costs and numbers of identified staff to whom remuneration provisions regarding deferral and pay out in instruments need to be applied.
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Q30: Are the different provisions regarding the oversight on remuneration policies, disclosure and transparency a concern for firms regarding the level playing field between different investment firm, UCITS management companies and AIFMs, e.g., with regard to the costs for the application of the requirements or the need to align these underlying provisions? Please provide a reasoning for your position.
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Q31: What would be costs or benefits of extending existing reporting requirement to financial information? Which other elements should be considered before introducing such requirement?
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Q32: Should there be the need to introduce prudential requirement for firms active in commodity markets and that are not currently subject to prudential requirements? How could the existing framework for investment firms be adapted for those cases? If a different prudential framework needs to be developed, what are the main elements that should be considered?
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