Article 44(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD), provides that resolution authorities shall not exercise the write down or conversion powers in relation to the following liabilities whether they are governed by the law of a Member State or of a third country:

"(a) covered deposits;
(b) secured liabilities including covered bonds and liabilities in the form of financial instruments used for hedging purposes which form an integral part of the cover pool and which according to national law are secured in a way similar to covered bonds;
(c) any liability that arises by virtue of the holding by the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1 (1) of this Directive of client assets or client money including client assets or client money held on behalf of UCITS as defined in Article 1(2) of Directive 2009/65/EC or of AIFs as defined in point (a) of Article 4 (1) of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (1 ), provided that such a client is protected under the applicable insolvency law;
(d) any liability that arises by virtue of a fiduciary relationship between the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1 (1) (as fiduciary) and another person (as beneficiary) provided that such a beneficiary is protected under the applicable insolvency or civil law;
(e) liabilities to institutions, excluding entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity of less than seven days;
(f) liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than seven days, owed to systems or operators of systems designated according to Directive 98/26/EC or their participants and arising from the participation in such a system;

(f) liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than seven days, owed to systems or operators of systems designated in accordance with Directive 98/26/EC or to their participants and arising from the participation in such a system, or to CCPs authorised in the Union pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and third-country CCPs recognised by ESMA pursuant to Article 25 of that Regulation;
(g) a liability to any one of the following:
(i) an employee, in relation to accrued salary, pension benefits or other fixed remuneration, except for the variable component of remuneration that is not regulated by a collective bargaining agreement;
(ii) a commercial or trade creditor arising from the provision to the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) of goods or services that are critical to the daily functioning of its operations, including IT services, utilities and the rental, servicing and upkeep of premises;
(iii) tax and social security authorities, provided that those liabilities are preferred under the applicable law;
(iv) deposit guarantee schemes arising from contributions due in accordance with Directive 2014/49/EU.

(h) liabilities to institutions or entities referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) that are part of the same resolution group without being themselves resolution entities, regardless of their maturities, except where those liabilities rank below ordinary unsecured liabilities under the relevant national law governing normal insolvency proceedings applicable on the date of transposition of this Directive; in cases where that exception applies, the resolution authority of the relevant subsidiary that is not a resolution entity shall assess whether the amount of items complying with Article 45f(2) is sufficient to support the implementation of the preferred resolution strategy.

Point (g) (i) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to the variable component of the remuneration of material risk takers as identified in Article 92(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Member States shall ensure that all secured assets relating to a covered bond cover pool remain unaffected, segregated and with enough funding. Neither that requirement nor point (b) of the first subparagraph shall prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any part of a secured liability or a liability for which collateral has been pledged that exceeds the value of the assets, pledge, lien or collateral against which it is secured.
Point (a) of the first subparagraph shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a deposit that exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU.
Without prejudice to the large exposure rules in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, Member States shall ensure that in order to provide for the resolvability of institutions and groups, resolution authorities limit, in accordance with point (b) of Article 17(5) of this Directive, the extent to which other institutions hold bail-inable liabilities eligible for a bail-in tool, save for liabilities that are held at entities that are part of the same group."

Article 44(3) provides that in exceptional circumstances, where the bail-in tool is applied, the resolution authority may exclude or partially exclude certain liabilities from the application of the write-down or conversion powers where:

"(a) it is not possible to bail-in that liability within a reasonable time notwithstanding the good faith efforts of the resolution authority;
(b) the exclusion is strictly necessary and is proportionate to achieve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines in a manner that maintains the ability of the institution under resolution to continue key operations, services and transactions;
(c) the exclusion is strictly necessary and proportionate to avoid giving rise to widespread contagion, in particular as regards eligible deposits held by natural persons and micro, small and medium sized enterprises, which would severely disrupt the functioning of financial markets, including of financial market infrastructures, in a manner that could cause a serious disturbance to the economy of a Member State or of the Union; or
(d) the application of the bail-in tool to those liabilities would cause a destruction in value such that the losses borne by other creditors would be higher than if those liabilities were excluded from bail-in.

Resolution authorities shall carefully assess whether liabilities to institutions or entities referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) that are part of the same resolution group without being themselves resolution entities and that are not excluded from the application of the write down and conversion powers under point (h) of paragraph (2) of this Article should be excluded or partially excluded under points (a) to (d) of the first subparagraph of this paragraph to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution strategy.
Where a resolution authority decides to exclude or partially exclude an eligible liability or class of eligible liabilities under this paragraph, the level of write down or conversion applied to other eligible liabilities may be increased to take account of such exclusions, provided that the level of write down and conversion applied to other eligible liabilities complies with the principle in point (g) of Article 34 (1)."

Bail-in of emergency liquidity assistance provided by the central bank seems to be in conflict with one of the objectives of the BRRD, i.e. that taxpayers should not bear the costs of failing banks.